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On Domesticating Giants:
Further Reflections
on the Legal Approach

to Transnational Enterprise*
A. A. Fatouros**
Writing on transnational enterprise' has by now reached
the proportions of a major flood. Although much of the recent literature debates the pros and cons of possible regulation, only a small part of it is specifically legal writing. The
aim of the present paper is to inquire into some major problems that a legal approach to the subject must face; stopping short, however, of consideration of the actual
possibilities of national and international regulation. These
*This article continues a line of inquiry begun long ago at the University of Western
Ontario, at a time when transnational enterprise was dealt with under the heading of
"direct private foreign investment." It picks up and develops certain points made in
some relatively recent articles of mine, such as, The Computer and the Mudhut:
Notes on MultinationalEnterprise in Developing Countries (1971), 10 Columbia J.
Transn'l. L. 325; Multinational Enterprise and Extraterritoriality (1972), 1 J. Contemporary Business (No. 4); and especially, Problemes et methodes d'une
reglementation des enterprises multinationales (1974), 101 J. Droit Int'l (Clunet)
495.
**Professor of Law, Indiana University.
The term itself is by no means well-settled. The two adjectives most commonly
used are "multinational" and "transnational." Both are acceptable, although I now
prefer the latter because it is least subject to misunderstanding and has, in addition, been adopted by the United Nations. The main difficulty in usage arises with
respect to the noun. Either "enterprise" or "firm" is appropriate (although the
former term is a little problematic outside United States parlance). European legal
literature uses the equally acceptable - indeed slightly more accurate - term of
"group of companies." But another noun is also in common usage, "corporation,"
and that unfortunately is both inexact and confusing. Since a multinational firm
consists of several discret corporations, it is by no means clear whether the term
"multinational (or transnational) corporation" covers the entire complex of discrete
"establishments" or solely (or chiefly) the parent, or headquarters, company. Unfortunately, this noun seems to have been adopted in the usage of official publications of both the United States and the United Nations. In this paper, I shall be using the term "transnational enterprise, keeping in mind that several of the authors
mentioned or quoted may be using differing terms to refer to the same
phenomenon.
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should be the topic of a later companion study, once certain
developments currently in process reach a stabler (and more
visible) stage.
This paper will therefore start by briefly surveying some
problems of definition, will proceed to a discussion of the
specificity of transnational enterprise as a legal (and
economico-political) phenomenon, and will then attempt an
elucidation of the concept, which will include a consideration
of the process of transfer of technology and its importance
for our topic. The article will then discuss the issue of socalled "extraterritoriality" as an illustration of the complex
manner in which the problems of transnational enterprise
arise in law. It will conclude with a consideration of possible
general goals and patterns of legal regulation.
The Definitional Maze
The term "transnational enterprise" is not a legal term
of art; it has no established or necessary meaning in law. It is
still largely a nonlegal term, somewhat apologetically used in
legal discourse because of its current prevalence in other
disciplines. Most definitions in use are derived from business
literature and the extent to which they possess or can be
made to have legal meaning is limited. According to the
most prevalent among the various formulations, a multinational enterprise consists of a cluster of companies incorporated in several countries, joined together by ties of
common control, with access to a common pool of human
and financial resources and responsive to a common
management strategy. 2 The definition is not inaccurate, but
it is of little help in concrete legal contexts. The various
"elements" of it, although listed seriatim, are in fact interconnected and overlapping. They have no clear borderlines
and some of them have no definite core of meaning. A more
legally-oriented definition has been given by Professor Berthold Goldman, according to whom the "multinational group
of companies" is "a complex of legally discrete companies,
linked to several countries, which form economically a single
enterprise, or at least a closely coordinated enterprise, which
2

R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay. The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises
(New York: Basic Books, 1970) at 4; Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay (1968),
47 Foreign Affairs 110 at 114. And cf. D. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A
New Challange for Transnational Law (1970), 83 Harvard L. Rev. 739 at 740 &
745-46.

A. A. Fatouros

exercises international
activities under the direction of a
3
parent company."

Economic, business or political definitions of transnational
enterprise follow a variety of approaches. 4 Some stress
quantitative tests: according to them an enterprise is
multinational when its international operations (i.e. those
outside the home state) are sizeable-in terms of total
assets, sales, production or employees, or of the number of
foreign-based affiliates. Other definitions look to the
organization of the firm, its managerial structure, and the
degree of centralization in decision making. Finally, others
employ behavioural tests: the attitude of top managers, their
perception of the firm and their consequent policies. This last
approach often ends up with tripartite distinctions:
ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric enterprise
(Perlmutter), national, multinational and global (or international) firm (Kindleberger and others).
There are as yet no authoritative legal definitions. A recent
one is found in the Guidelines to Multinational Enterprises of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, even though it is preceded by the assertion that "
precise legal definition . . . is not required" for their purposes. According to the Guidelines, multinational enterprises
usually comprise companies or other entities whose ownership is
private, state or mixed, established in different countries and so
linked that one or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others and, in particular, to
share knowledge and resources with the others. The degree of
autonomy of each entity in relation to the others varies widely
from one multinational enterprise to another, depending on the
nature of the links between such entities and the fields of activity
concerned.5
A single definition may be convenient and even useful in
law, but it is not indispensable. It may be premature to attempt to establish a definition which would apply to all relevant legal situations. For the time being, several definitions
differing from one another in some respects may be usefully
3 B. Goldman, Cours de droit de commerce international 1972-1973 102 (mimeo.,
1973).
4 For an exploration of definitions, see Y. Aharoni, "On the Definition of a Multinational Corporation," in A. Kapoer and P.D. Grub, eds., The Multinational Enterprise in Transition (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1972) at 3.
5 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976), Para. 8 of "Preamble to Guidelines".
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employed, depending on the particular purposes of the legal
text (or context). If, for instance, it is sought to regulate by
national legislation the activities of transnational enterprise,
a "normative" definition, that is to say, a definition founded
on criteria which refer to an ideal (i.e., favoured) model of
such enterprise, may have to be utilized. For the purpose of
tax or antitrust laws, a different kind of definition, based on
quantitative or structural criteria, may be more appropriate.
What is Specific About Transnational Enterprise?
Transnational enterprise is a recent phenomenon. In the
nineteenth century, and even, with small change, until the
Second World War, international investment was primarily
indirect, portfolio investment (i.e., investment in bonds and
securities, not involving direct control of involvement in
operations abroad). A major exception was the United
States. In American investments abroad, especially in Latin
America, direct, equity investments (i.e., those involving
control of the foreign enterprise's operation) played an important role. After 1950, transnational enterprise took off,
because of a conjunction of several factors: United States
technological lead, growth of new managerial techniques
closely linked to new communication possibilities (computers, telex, air travel), significant liberalization of world
trade and investment, development and importance of large
oligopolistic firms (which have always dominated foreign investment).
It is possible to visualize the growth of transnational enterprise in at least two schematic fashions, starting in both instances from a hypothetical small firm, producing only in the
home country for the local market. One may then discuss the
growth of exports (to foreign importers), increasing use of
permanent non-productive facilities abroad (warehouses,
agencies), then the establishment of processing (packaging,6
assembly) plants abroad and finally production abroad.
Each stage raises different problems, many of which do not
yet have any adequate legal formulation. The law tends to
rely on certain basic concepts, or patterns, which may reflect
economic and business reality in one stage, but not in
6 Cf. W.A. Dymsza, Multinational Business Strategy (New York: McGraw Hill,

1972) at 7.
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another. Thus, all export (or import) transactions are
modelled in law on the first of the stages just listed: the
"arm's length" contract between an exporting firm and a
foreign importer, over whom the seller has no control. The
same model is by and large used even when dealing with a
transaction between two affiliates of a transnational enterprise located in different countries.
The second approach to the growth of transnational enterprise stresses the changes in the firm's managerial structure.
Starting with the early small firm model, with a single versatile manager-owner, it moves to the functionally
specialized firm (with a president or managing director and
managers in charge of production, marketing and finance
divisions) and the firm whose production is diversified (with
divisions devoted to each main category of products.) Expansion abroad leads to creation of an international division,
at the same (managerial) level as the domestic productoriented divisions. Further expansion, however, invites a
geographical allocation of managerial responsibility (each
division in charge
of a region) or an international product7
based allocation.

It is clear that no exact correspondence exists between
legal and managerial structures of organization. Each
responds to different needs and influences. While we cannot
refute an intuitive perception of some interaction, there is as
yet no serious research, on a general enough level, concerning such interaction and the reciprocal influence of legal and
managerial structures and forms.
For a specific, discrete, legal concept (or institution) to
emerge, it must be distinguishable from other related concepts and there must be good reason to differentiate it. In
terms of the instant case, the fundamental questions are, "Is
it possible to separate transnational enterprises from other
firms which are not transnational?" and "Is it appropriate,
useful, to do so?" or, in other words, "What difference
would such a differentiation make?" The brief discussion of
definitions suggests that it is certainly possible to devise
criteria for distinguishing transnational from nontransnational enterprises, keeping in mind, however, that,
7 Cf. J. M. Stopford and L.T. Wells, Jr., Managing the Multinational Enterprise

(New York: Basic Books, 1972) at9.
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(1) certain important similarities continue to exist (e.g., all
large firms, whether transnational or not, share certain
characteristics), and (2) the borderlines between transnational and non-transnational enterprises are fuzzy and uncertain. (for example, should a firm that only exports abroad
ever be called transnational? Is a firm that only licenses its
patents or trademarks abroad transnational? Is a United
States firm with a single subsidiary in Canada or in Mexico a
transnational enterprise?)
The usefulness of the distinction is the most important
test. In my submission, it is proper to separate transnational
enterprises from other firms because the former exhibit certain traits which are peculiar to them, and may therefore require specific legal treatment. The ability of transnational
enterprise to combine multiple identities (subsidiaries) with a
single strategy makes it remarkably flexible and mobile. It
can, if it is worth the effort, evade much governmental
regulation; more important, it can in many instances take advantage of, and derive benefit from, the differences in
economic and legal conditions prevalent in various countries. The legal rules established by positive law to govern
private transnational relations and transactions are often inapplicable to transnational firms. The tests and criteria
specified cannot be met, the purposes of the rules cannot be
served. The problems of "nationality" of corporations in
conflict of laws and, especially, in public international law,
are a signal case in point. At the same time, the assumptions
as to economic and other facts which underlie much of the
law are no longer appropriate where transnational enterprises are concerned. Thus, the price agreed upon by the
parties in a sales transaction may normally be considered as
corresponding to market constraints, subject to exceptions in
cases of collusion, etc. But the price in a sale between affiliates may have nothing to do with market forces; it reflects
the internal needs and processes within the transnational
enterprise, which may or may not correspond directly to
market forces. Finally, through its transnational operations,
its presence in many territories as a powerful actor, the
transnational enterprise may be a significant underlying factor in creating or exacerbating (international) conflicts. And
the vertical, hierarchical, relationships among the firm's
several units, across national borders, compete with the
equally vertical state-to-citizen relationships within each nation.
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Some Difficulties of a Legal Approach
Given these elements of uniqueness, the question arises:
why has law been so late in recognizing and accepting the
reality of transnational enterprise? One must begin with the
fact that if transnational enterprise is an important economic
phenomenon, founded on new technological capabilities, it
is also a legal phenomenon. More than that: transnational
enterprise is a creature of law, national as much as international. Its legal aspects are not secondary or derivative; they
are of the very essence of the phenomenon. The fundamental feature of transnational enterprise, the retention of unity
within a flexible pluralist context, is only possible with the
help of law.
The prevailing economic, legal and political systems,
especially in the developed states, have made possible the
growth of enterprises which transcend national borders
while retaining their unity. The potential for transnational
enterprise was thus already present, but it could not have
become real without the efforts of a large number of jurists,
mostly counsel to the enterprises in question, who managed
to discover and utilize the pre-existing possibilities. Fashioning a new form of enterprise, on a plurinational legal and
economic basis, was in the main a technical task, involving
much work of detail, using already established methods and
legal instruments. With these rather commonplace materials
a novel legal phenomenon was constructed. Even if one has
doubts as to the social utility of transnational enterprise, one
must appreciate and even admire the talent and the accomplishment of its creators.
Finally, the recent development of transnational enterprise
must also be attributed to certain changes in the structure
and principles of the international legal order. International
agreements, multilateral and bilateral, from G.A.T.T. to
treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, have combined with the action of international organizations, such as
the International Monetary Fund and the O.E.C.D., and with
unilateral state practice, to bring about an increased acceptance of freedom of movement for capital, commodities and
persons, an increase of communication among states, and
an advanced degree of international legal security. While
total freedom of movement of the factors of production has
by no means been established, it is enough to compare the
present situation with that of thirty or forty years ago to
perceive the extent of the change. Internationalization of
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production became possible only when the legal obstacles to
the movement of factors of production became fewer and
less important.8
The relative lack of interest on the part of legal scholars in
the emergence of transnational enterprise is thus more
paradoxical than it would appear at first blush. One should
insist, moreover, that it is a lack of interest on the part of
legal scholars that is involved here, not neglect by the
"law" - at least not when by "law" we refer to the entire
complex process of authoritative decision-making. If we
consider the responses of national legal orders in their entirety, we find that the phenomenon of transnational enterprise
has not been totally disregarded. Legal practice, whether
legislative, judicial or administrative, has dealt with the principal manifestations of the phenomenon in concrete context
and has managed in the main to deal successfully with it.9
Company law, to varying extents, has taken into consideration the structural relationships between companies. In German law an entire chapter of company law deals with the
Konzern, that is to say, the enterprise composed of several
companies. The concept of "group of companies" has been
proposed or established in several other European legal
systems and is included in the project of a "European corporation". Antitrust law has dealt with the concept of
"enterprise", as distinguished from corporation, in a variety
of contexts. "Lifting the veil" of corporate personality is by
no means an exceptional or surprising feature in several
areas of law. In other branches of the law, specific provisions
dealing - solely or primarily - with transnational enterprise
are not uncommon. In tax law relations among affiliated corporations are often dealt with specifically, as under Article
482 of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or under
provisions of bilateral agreements, or in a variety of other
manners by other legal systems. 10 The extraterritorial reach
of certain laws, especially antitrust laws, which will be
discussed later, must be seen in several cases as an effort on
8 No inference of a one-way causal connection should be drawn. In broader
perspective, it would be equally true (indeed, more so) for an economist or a
historian to say that, when other objective conditions for the internationalization of
production were ripe, the legal obstacles to it were gradually removed. The pertinent point here is not the identity of the ultimate cause, but the significance of
legal developments.
9 See Y. Hadari, The Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise (1973), 71
Mich. L. Rev. 729; and Vagts, supra n.2.
10 On the complexities of this type of measure, see H. LaMont, Multinational Enterprise, Transfer Pricing, and the 482 Mess (1975), 14 Columbia J. Transn'l L. 383.
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the part of courts and administrative authorities to take into
consideration and to give effect to the reality of the multinational expansion of enterprises.
The neglect of transnational enterprise by the law is thus
limited in actuality to a relative neglect on the part of legal
scholars. What has not yet been done, or not yet been done
well, is to construct appropriate legal doctrine taking into account in ordered fashion the multiple manifestations of
transnational enterprise. Such a delay on the part of scholars
in dealing with reality is not unique: economists, too, did not
recognize the existence of transnational enterprise until quite
recently. Doctrinal delay in the case of law may be attributed
to a number of causes: the fast pace of the growth of
transnational enterprise in recent years; a certain conservative tendency on the part of legal thinking, which makes
dealing with novel concepts more difficult; from a political or
sociological viewpoint, a certain reluctance on the part of
lawyers to examine critically the foundations of the
economic and political system which they serve.
Another cause is what may be called the "binary bias" of
legal thinking: there is a tendency in law to articulate problems in terms of bilateral relationships, on a two-pole continuum or on a two-party basis. A traditional method of legal
analysis, when faced with complex legal situations, is to
isolate the several pairs of possibly pertinent parties and then
proceed to examine each pair of legal relations by itself.
(Witness the sometimes excessive usage of the "-or" and "ee" terminology.) The usefulness and practical applicability
of this method cannot be denied. Nevertheless, when dealing with complex phenomena it has definite limitations. In
the case at hand, the main trouble seems to be that this manner of thinking deprives the legal manifestations of transnational enterprise of any originality. A study of the various
relationships, within or with a transnational enterprise, solely
in bilateral terms often yields banal findings, not significantly
differing from those of other relationships of the same
general legal category. The peculiar character of transnational enterprise is primarily manifested in interactions within
a total system, in the contemporaneous interrelationships of
several kinds and levels of entities. The specificity of such a
total interaction is not perceived when it is studied as an aggregate of several binary relationships.
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Toward an Elucidation of the Concept
To elucidate, rather than rigorously define, the concept of
transnational enterprise, it is necessary to stress its inherent
duality, the tension between its two basic elements, each
corresponding to one of the words composing the term. The
transnational enterprise is an enterprise; that is to say, an
organizational complex, a highly complex organization. Its
basic characteristic is unity: unity of action, unity of
strategy, unity of decision, unity of technical, financial and
human resources. The reference to "common strategy," in
the usual definitions," may be misleading in one respect: it
seems to suggest (although this implication is clearly rejected in some of the writings using that definition) that the
relations between the separate constitutive units of the
transnational enterprise are on an equal, horizontal, basis. In
fact, the transnational enterprise, like most business enterprises, is fundamentally hierarchical. The principal relationship among its units is a vertical relationship, a relationship of
subordination. Despite several qualifications, necessary to
account for modern practices of management, the fundamental model of the decision-making process in the enterprise remains the pyramid. Thus, the unity of the enterprise
is manifested primarily by the presence of a decision making
centre, a single centre, the commands of which determine
the behavior of the separate units and of the various agents
of the enterprise. The common strategy of the enterprise is
in fact that aggregate of the decisions coming from that
centre.
The actual degree of centralized control and of intensity of
interactions (integration) among affilites varies widely
among transnational enterprises. To some extent, this
reflects differences in policies and in approach to management. It also frequently reflects economic and business factors. Professor Jack Behrman has distinguished in this connection three broad categories of companies: those that are
oriented toward resources (whether minerals and fruit, or
cheap labour), those that are market-oriented, and those that
are governed in their world-wide operations by considerations of efficiency.1 2 The greatest degree of centralized integration is found in the last category; it varies considerably
"

See, e.g., text accompanying note 2, supra.
the most recent formulation in J.N. Behrman, Decision Criteria for Foreign
Direct Investment in Latin America (New York: Unipub., for Council of the
Americas, 1974)

12 See
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in the other two. At the same time, a single enterprise may
combine in its operations more than one of the above orientations. Yet, the role and the extent of centralized decision
making should not be underrated. Several recent studies
stress the drive toward and
the actual degree of centraliza13
tion in transnational firms.
In legal perspective, it is the possibility rather than the actual utilization of centralized integration that is significant.
The relationship between centre and periphery is a fundamental feature of transnational enterprise. In law, as in
economics, this relationship is expressed by the notion of
control. Control denotes a relationship where the decisions
of one party determine the behaviour of the other, or in legal
terms, where one party has the (legal) authority to decide
concerning the behaviour of the other. The advantage of this
notion (over that of "common strategy", for instance) is that
it suggests a hierarchical relationship, not an egalitarian one.
At the same time, it allows some differentiation between the
two parties (especially when it is perceived as a matter of
degree); it does not lump them together as a single entity.
The importance of this concept becomes clearer when the
second constitutive element of the transnational enterprise is
considered.
The transnational, or multinational, character of the enterprise refers to its presence within the territories of several
sovereign states. The transnational enterprise is thus marked
by a dual plurality: first, it consists of several corporations
whose legal personalities are distinct; second, these corporations are established by virtue of several national laws, thus
having prima facie different nationalities.1 4 It is true that this
plurality is in a way a mere appearance: it is the transnational
enterprise itself, as an enterprise, that is present within more
13

See M. Z. Brooke and H.L. Remneis, The Strategy of Multinational Enterprise:

Organization and Finance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970) at
64-124; A.S. Golbert and J.J. Wilson, Centralizing the International Operations of
Multinationals (1973), 11 San Diego L. Rev. 70. And cf. R.S. Newfarmer and
W.F. Mueller, Multinational Corporations in Brazil and Mexico: Structural
Sources of Economic and Noneconomic Power (Report to the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relation:
Washington, 1975) at 145-153.
14 The issue of corporate nationality is, of course, more complicated than that. For a
useful brief review of the problems and the alternative criteria used, see, D.
Vagts, supra note 2, at 740-43. And see, for more extended treatment, Note, The
"Nationality;" ofInternational Corporations under Civil Law and Treaty (1961), 74
Harvard L. Rev. 1429; K. Ginther, Nationality of Corporations (1966), 16 Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fuer Oeffentliches Recht 27.
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than one territory. Yet the plurality retains, nevertheless, a
certain reality: in addition to formal legal responsibility, each
corporation often retains a partial identity.
The concept of presence within a territory is not as simple
as it appears at first blush. Several of the definitions of
transnational enterprise insist on the serious and clear cut
character which the presence of the enterprise must have
within a given territory. Such presence must be manifested
by establishments having a distinct personality and by operations of production, not merely marketing (exports). To
understand better the meaning of presence we must again
refer to the notion of control, which thus becomes the
dialectical link between the two fundamental and at first
glance opposed features of the transnational enterprise. An
enterprise is present within a territory whenever there are
distinct establishments in that territory which are under the
effective control of the enterprise's decision-making centre.
The modalities of presence of transnational enterprise correspond then to the modalities of control. For there are
several manners and instruments of control. The principal
one, often treated as the paradigm of control, is the whollyowned subsidiary. A similar modality is that of majority
shareholding by a parent company in a subsidiary. In both
cases the fact of control is easy to perceive, although the
particular manners of exercise of this control are many and
sometimes complex. Shareholding on a 50-50 basis or on a
minority basis constitutes another method of control. The
reality of control becomes then a question of fact. The forms
of exercise of the control may be found in the structure of
the enterprise-for instance, in the particular provisions of
the charter of the joint venture - they may exist de facto, as
in cases of overwhelming technological dependence, or they
may be established by contractual devices. The direction of
the operations of the subordinate corporation may be
assured by means of transfer of technology contracts. To insure execution of a common strategy, it is not necessary for
the parent company to control all operations of the subordinate unit. It is enough if it has the power to determine the
operations deemed important, that is, those operations
which are relevant to the global activities of the transnational
enterprise. A company which is legally independent may
therefore be part of a transnational system of control by a
transnational enterprise. Long term contracts involving both
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transfer of technology and sales of products may often
establish such relationships.
Transfer of technology contracts are frequently utilized
between parent and subsidiary companies, not only between
a transnational enterprise and a company that is more or less
independent. Such use is due to a number of practical considerations: need to protect patents and trademarks, desire
to establish uniformity of practice, utilization of such contracts as instruments of tax evasion or for avoidance of
foreign exchange regulations, etc. Thus the contracts of
transfer of technology, which are the legal form of the access of affiliated establishments to the transnational enterprise's common resources, are at one and the same time a
consequence of the control exercised by the decisionmaking centre of the enterprise and one of the principal
means for acquiring and exercising this control. Their role is
particularly important from a legal point of view, since those
contracts are much more visible and therefore more capable
of being analyzed (and regulated).
Transnational Enterprise and the Process of
Technology Transfer
The process of transfer of technology, although not
necessarily or solely linked to the activities of transnational
enterprises, is of particular significance and deserves further
attention. It is increasingly being recognized as a most important (if not the most important) facet of the resource
transfers which affect economic growth and development.
Under the generic term, "transfer of technology", are
nowadays subsumed all the processes whereby knowledge,
experience and skills, applied to production of commodities
(and services) are transmitted across national borders. The
concept includes transfers of knowledge by means of books,
magazines, transnational professional associations, etc.,
although, for our purposes, only the commercial modalities
will be discussed. These include transfers of technology
which is already "incorporated" in machinery and equipment, transfers of information and know-how (patents,
blueprints, etc.), and transfers of skills through training or
through services of highly skilled persons. In terms of the
legal instruments involved, we are dealing with contracts of
sale of equipment (often containing provisions for installation and initial operation), patent and trademark licensing
agreements, and agreements for transfer of know-how, provisions of technical assistance, and management.
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As several studies (in particular by regional Latin American
organizations and by UNCTAD) 15 have made apparent, the
transnational market for technology exhibits several serious
imperfections. There is an inherent lack of equality in
bargaining power between the parties, since by definition the
technology supplier is better informed about the features of
the "commodity" at issue than the technology buyer. It is,
moreover, rarely a perfect competition market; the suppliers
are sometimes monopolists, most often oligopolistic. Linked
to the differing bargaining position of the parties is the
"packaging" issue. A given technology, perceived as a complex process of production, may be transferred in one single
transaction or it may be broken down into as many of its
elements as is reasonably feasible and the elements transferred one by one. While "packaged" transfers are often
necessary and sometimes useful to both parties, they
frequently present serious disadvantages for the recipient.
The total cost is usually higher, often through the operation
of hidden elements of cost; the adaptation of the technology
to local needs and resources is more difficult; and the transfer may not improve the recipient country's (or firm's)
autonomous capacity for technological growth.
The three considerations just mentioned predominate in
the recipient (especially developing) countries' concerns
about technology transfers. Costs are often too high and too
uncertain. Transfers of technology involve for recipients
direct and indirect financial costs (royalties and fees as well
as charges resulting from "overpricing" of equipment, of
"tied" intermediate goods, and of raw materials, and from
capitalization of technology); they also have broad indirect
effects on the economy (constraints, distortions, bottlenecks) which may be seen as a kind of cost. Use of appropriate technology and adaptation of technology to the
needs and conditions of the recipient country are important
considerations. They involve the need for freer choice between alternative technologies (e.g., labor-intensive vs.
capital-intensive) but also a degree of "unpackaging" of
technology which makes possible changes and adjustments
of the processes and equipment used to local conditions and
capabilities. Finally, the most significant long-run objective
15UNCTAD, Guidelines for the Study of the Transfer of Technology to Developing
Countries (1972); UNCTAD, Major Issues Arising From the Transfer of
Technology to Developing Countries (1975); UNCTAD, An International Code of
Conduct on Transfer of Technology (1975).
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of technology-receiving countries must be attainment of an
independent capability for technological growth. This involves elimination (or decrease) of long-term technological
dependence and development of indigenous scientific and
technological capabilities. Constant learning through trial
and error becomes necessary as well as utilization of local
scientific resources to generate technological change. (As
some economists have noted, science in developing countries is generally unrelated to production and to productive
technology, thus becoming for the national economy an element of consumption rather than, as in developed countries,
investment. )16
The relationship of these three objectives to one another is
complex and sometimes paradoxical. For instance, a significant lowering of transfer of technology costs might constitute a disincentive for the growth of autonomous
technological capabilities. As with all social issues, relations
are dialectical and neither simple nor unilinear.
From a more narrowly legal point of view, the main legal
instruments employed with respect to technology transfers
are contracts: patent and trademark licensing agreements,
management contracts, agreements for the transfer of
know-how, etc. There is an important legal distinction between agreements relating to legally protected industrial
property-patents and trademarks-and those which relate
to unpatented technology, which acquires legal protection
soley on the basis of the agreements itself. Transfer of
technology agreements determine, usually in considerable
detail, the rights and obligations of the two parties.
The role of transnational enterprise in the transfer of
technology process is generally acknowledged as most important, although its exact form and dimensions are by no
means clear. Very broadly it may be suggested that transnational enterprises have increased power and flexibility to impose their conditions on licensees, especially in developing
countries. Their concern for long-run stability, their relative
rigidity toward variations (in other words, their propensity to
uniformity), the centralization of their research and development activities and of their management, as well as the
relative scarcity of one major resource they provide, innovative managerial talent, all these combine to cause a
relative lack of responsiveness on their part to local condi16See, C. Cooper, Science, Technology and Production in Underdeveloped Countries: An Introduction (1972), 9 J. Development Studies 1 at 5.
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tions, in terms of adaptation of technology (and products)
and use of appropriate technology (e.g., use of laborintensive rather than capital-intensive methods of production). The domination of transnational enterprises in consumer industries where marketing and advertising considerations predominate (cigarettes, soft drinks, etc.) suggests
that in many arrangements no basic technology and no new
skills are transferred.
Problems are compounded by the relative lack of
awareness, until recently, of the need for the legal regulation
of transfer of technology in most developing countries. Basic
patent and trademark laws, modelled on those of developed
countries, are often unrelated to developmental considerations. They may even constitute impediments to a country's
development efforts. Other policies based on fears of abuse
or fraud, such as those discouraging licensing or the use of
second-hand (or not "up-to-date") equipment, may also
tend to impede efforts for adaptation of technology. In recent years, however, many countries, particularly Latin
American ones, have started to regulate 17
specifically and stringently the technology transfer process.
The Extraterritorial Reach of National Laws
Of the legal problems which arise in connection with or as
a result of transnational enterprise, the question of so-called
"extraterritoriality" has received the most attention,
especially in Canada. This may or may not reflect its real
significance. The term itself, "extraterritoriality", is not
neutral or value-free. It implies an unwarranted extension of
jurisdiction or an attempt at enforcement beyond the (by implication normal and proper) territorial jurisdiction of a state.
It reminds us unavoidably of the privileged "extraterritoriality" of Europeans, and whites in general, under the "capitulations" regime in China, Egypt, Turkey and other Third World
countries (to use the current term) which happened to remain independent during the European imperialist-colonial
expansion of the last century. The term implies therefore
privileged and oppressive extension of a dominant state's
jurisdiction. As such, it does not merely point to a problem or
identify a factual situation; it expresses a derogatory conclusion. It is, however, of sufficiently established usage that it
would be cumbersome to attempt to replace it here with
another.
17See the surveys in the UNCTAD documents cited supra note 14.
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In international law, extraterritoriality is seen as an aspect
of the general problem of allocation of jurisdiction in a world
of many formally equal nation-states. Jurisdiction, as is well
known, is a government's authority and ability to prescribe
and enforce rules of law. Given the plurality of governments,
jurisdiction may, in any particular instance, be either exclusive, when only one government possesses the authority
and ability mentioned, or concurrent, when two or more
governments possess them. Conflicts arise when several
states claim exclusive jurisdiction over a person or event or
when their claims to concurrent jurisdiction are incompatible. In this context, issues of extraterritoriality arise
whenever the judicial, administrative, or legislative
authorities of one state seek (or appear to seek) to extend
application of its laws to events and activities in the territory
of another state.
Any time an act occurs with legal consequences which cut
across national borders, there may be problems of extraterritoriality. In the more traditional areas of law (private law,
criminal law) few serious difficulties have been encountered
in recent years. Conflicts or potential conflicts are dealt with
under fairly well-established doctrines, principles and rules of
jurisdiction and conflict of laws. The more controversial recent conflicts occur where economic regulation, in whatever
precise form, is involved. In such cases, the policy principles
prevalent in each state may differ or the acts involved may
affect the national interest of several states in differing manners. In three major areas, the efforts of home countriesespecially but not solely the United States-to apply their
laws to foreign business operations of transnational enterprises based in their territory have created difficult problems.
These are the areas of export controls, antitrust, and
securities regulation.
The specific legal problems of the extraterritorial reach of
United States law in such cases have been discussed at
length in the legal literature. 18 It seems more useful, at this
point, to approach the issues in more abstract fashion and to
seek to summarize, more or less schematically, the channels
or manners in which home states, particularly the United
States, have sought, or may seek, to apply their laws or administrative regulations outside their territory.
18 For an excellent recent brief survey, see S.J. Rubin, "The Multinational Enter-

prise and the "Home" State," in G.W. Ball, ed., Global Companies: The Political
Economy of World Business (Englewood Ciffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975) 42 at 45-56.
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A first method, simple although difficult to detect and
describe, is the manipulation of facts. Courts and administrative authorities may formally find that the activities
involved have taken place in part within the territory of the
United States, thus falling within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States authorities. No novel or controversial doctrinal basis is necessary; it is merely a matter of perception,
expressed in an authoritative finding as to a factual situation.
Considering the intangible character of the events and acts
involved in contemporary business activities, such a finding
of fact can often be made on the basis of otherwise ambiguous or equivocal facts. A close reading of the cases
leads to the conclusion that this method has been applied
fairly frequently in antitrust law and in securities regulation.
A second, somewhat related approach, is to stress the unity of parent and subsidiary, when only one of them is within
the state's territorial jurisdiction. The activity of a subsidiary
in the host (forum) country may be imputed to the parent,
located by hypothesis in some other country. The court (or
administrative official) may find that the parent and subsidiary corporations are, for business and economic purposes, a single unit; the subsidiary's activity within the territory is therefore the equivalent of the parent's activity-or,
indeed more frequently, vice versa. Whereas United States
authorities have tried to reach a foreign-based subsidiary by
exercising jurisdiction over a United States-based parent, the
reverse is relatively rare. States appear reluctant to use their
jurisdiction over the subsidiary as a means of extending their
reach over the parent. 19 Cases falling under this general approach would also include the numerous instances where
United States courts and administrative authorities have
sought evidence (documents, business books, etc.) from
subsidiaries or branches of United States-based corporations.
A third manner, closely related to, and perhaps in part
identical with, the second, is by way of control over the
home country's nationals. A state has jurisdiction over its nationals wherever they may be; it may impose on them obligations even when they are in foreign territory. Thus, some
regulations under the United States Trading with the Enemy
Act define the term "United States national" (to whom the
19 But note the Dyestuffs case, where the European Court (and Commission) were

able so to do: Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Commission of EC, Case
48/69, Ct. J.E.C., noted by E. Stendorffin (1972), 9 Common Market L. Rev. 494.
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Act applies) as including any corporate entity, incorporated
in the United States or abroad, which is beneficially owned
by a United States national. 20 A company incorporated in
Canada, but owned by a transnational enterprise based in
the United States, would thus be covered by the Act. It is
true, and interesting, that United States authorities rarely if
ever utilize this particular provision. They prefer to deal with
the parent company and hold it responsible for any sale
without a proper license by its subsidiary (thus essentially
reverting to the second approach described).
A fourth method applies similar reasoning to commodities
and products, tangible or intangible: a country allows the export of certain goods only to certain countries and under certain conditions; it may thereafter follow the goods, wherever
they may be, seeking to ensure observance of the conditions
under which they were exported. This is the method used by
the United States under the Export Administration Act,
which prohibits the "transshipment", without a license, of
United States-produced goods which have been exported
lawfully to another country. 21 Difficult problems may arise
when the United States-made goods have been incorporated
in the second country into finished (or more complex) products. The prohibition of export to Cuba of United Statesproduced goods may then become a ban on the export to
Cuba of largely Canadian-made products.
Finally, the fifth possible approach follows the principle
known as "objective territoriality" (or the "effects" doctrine). According to it, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe
over acts committed abroad which have substantial effects
within its territory. There is long-standing controversy concerning this doctrine; while it is generally accepted in the
case of traditionally criminal acts, it is frequently opposed
when applied in the context of economic regulation. In reality, and despite inclusive language in its support in some decisions and discussions, it has been quite rarely applied outside
traditional criminal law.
20

21

See 31 CFR sec. 500.329 (1975), implementing 50 U.S.C.A. App. sec. 1 ff(1968).
And cf. Comment, The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign-Based
Subsidiaries of American Multinational Corporations: A Time to Abstain from
Restraining (1973), 11 S. Dakota L. Rev. 206; J.I.W. Corcoran, The Trading with
the Enemy Act and the Controlled Canadian Corporations Owned by Americans
(1970), 16 McGill L.J. 460.
50 USCA App. sec. 2401 ff. (1976), replacing the Export Control Act, of 1949, 50
USCA App. sec. 2021 ff. (1964). See generally, H.J. Berman and J.R. Garson,
Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future (1967), 67 Columbia L. Rev. 791.

On Domesticating Giants

An additional problem, which has arisen in particular in
connection with the extraterritorial reach of antitrust law,
concerns the role of the foreign law or government. The
foreign government in whose territory the alleged criminal
act occurs may often tolerate the acts concerned. Indeed,
tolerance may shade into various degrees of approval; it may
well be that the foreign government (or more generally the
foreign law) positively and affirmatively approves of or even
compels the acts in question. This additional problem confuses the issues; the United States law on the subject is still
fairly unclear. It seems certain that if the foreign government
expressly orders the acts involved this will be an adequate
defense for the enterprises concerned. But other kinds of approval, permission, or tolerance by a foreign government
may well be disregarded. This line of reasoning seems to ignore the extent to which allowing certain activities is a policy
decision as significant, and sometimes as deliberate, as that
of prohibiting or compelling them. The possibility of various
kinds of manipulation are not excluded; an enterprise may
seek to have itself "compelled", by the foreign government,
in order to escape liability in the United States.
There will be no attempt to review here the doctrinal
subtleties of extraterritoriality problems. One question must
be raised, however; this is, in a way, the ultimate one: how
obnoxious are such incidents and possibilities of extraterritorial enforcement of another country's law? The more or
less traditional response, in terms of infringement of the
sovereignty of the foreign government, is inadequate. It is,
to begin with, too abstract; there are degrees and kinds of infringement which must be distinguished. Secondly, it
assumes that in a situation where there may be concurrent
jurisdiction over certain acts or events, enforcement of the
law of one of the states possessing jurisdiction is necessarily
an infringement of the other's sovereignty, disregarding, for
instance, the possibility of a lack of policy conflict. Finally,
the argument may be reversed: a home state may justifiably
argue that the legal claim by a host country that its tolerance
or encouragement of certain practices (which adversely effect the home state's economy) must be respected by the
home state, constitutes an extraterritorial extension of the
host state's jurisdiction. It is not that such an argument is
more persuasive than the other. It is simply that very broad
principles, at a high level of abstraction, can often be applied
in reversible manner.
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It seems more appropriate to differentiate among the
various areas where extraterritorial enforcement may be attempted. The most obnoxious area is certainly that of trade
controls. While the attempt by the home state (more
specifically the United States) to protect the integrity of its
policies and avoid their evasion cannot be considered as illegitimate, the enforcement of policies of such a purely
political character within a foreign country's territory infringes on fairly well-defined interests and policies of the host
government. It extensively limits the latter's ability to
develop and apply its own economic and other policies. It is
obvious, however, that what makes the problem important is
the extent of domination of the host country's economy (or a
sector thereof) by enterprises having their headquarters
within the home country, in particular the United States. If a
single company, out of several of equal importance, happens
to be owned by United States interests and therefore refused
to sell goods to Cuba, this does not seriously affect the host
country's interests. But where an entire sector, or a major
part of it, is in the hands of United States'owned subsidiaries, then the problem of extraterritorial application of
United States law acquires practical importance. It is the extent of the domination of the economy of a host country by
enterprises from the home country that determines the
degree of obnoxiousness of this most political case of extraterritorial application.
The case of controls over anti-competitive practices (antitrust) and securities and exchange operations is more ambiguous. The home country's interest in protecting its
economy or the persons active within it are quite legitimate;
and the host country's willingness to allow anti-competitive
or quasi-fraudulent practices does not always make for a
very persuasive case on its behalf.
In the final analysis, an answer must be given with respect
to each particular country and each kind of problem. Probably the country that has been most concerned with the
question of extraterritoriality in recent years has been
Canada, in view of the widespread operations in it of subsidiaries of United States-based multinational enterprises.
Even there, however, it would seem that few important
cases have arisen; several possible cases were settled
without much dispute between the two countries. 22 Cana2

See the useful review of the record by J.N. Behrman, NationalInterests and the
MultinationalEnterprise(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970) at 101-113.
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dian emphasis on the obnoxiousness of extraterritorial enforcement has considerably abated in recent years. Compare, for instance, the repeated assertion, in the Watkins
Report, that "the most serious cost to Canada of foreign
ownership and control results from the tendency of the U.S.
government to regard American-owned subsidiaries as subject to American law and policy",

23

with the way in which

the task force's chairman formulated his position a few years
later:
While extraterritoriality is an issue in its own right, its real importance lies in the fact that being

. .

." the tip of the iceberg" it

can alert us to the unseen nine-tenths. What is presumably going
on beneath the surface isan insidious tendency for foreign direct
investment to result in a shift of the focus of decision-making
from Canada, as host country, to the United States as imperium.
To imagine that eliminating extraterritoriality would remove this
political cost is similar to believing that removing iceberg tips
would make shipping less hazardous. 24
In the past two years, however, the issue has flared up
again. In early 1974, the United States-based parent of a
Canadian company applied on behalf of its subsidiary to the
Treasury Department, seeking a license for the sale of
twenty-five locomotives to Cuba. There was apparently considerable reluctance on the part of the United States
authorities to grant the license and the matter reached the
Secretary of State for final decision. The Canadian Government protested to the United States, insisting that the
United States regulations should not apply to subsidiaries in
Canada. The Canadian subsidiary's board of directors voted
to proceed with the sale (with one of the two United States
nationals on its board voting against, and the other being absent). 25 Another case came to the surface in late 1974, involving the sale of furniture to Cuba. In this instance, the
United States parent company had initially merely "asked
the Treasury Department informally whether the Trading
with the Enemy Act applied". On the Treasury's affirmative
response, they ordered their subsidiary not to proceed with
the sale. When the matter became public, the company
23Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry (Report of the Task

Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, 1968), at 360.
M. Watkins, "Preface", in K. Levitt, Silent Surrender. The Multinational Corporation in Canada (Toronto: New Press, 1970) at xiii-xiv.
2' The case is reported in detail in successive issues of (1974), 5 International
Canada at 21 and 45.
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proceeded to file formal
application for a license which was
26
eventually granted.

The second case illustrates another important aspect of
the problem. It is highly likely that the principal impact of extraterritorrial application of United States export controls occurs not through the denial of licenses applied for but
through United States Government "suggestions" to parent
companies or through the latter's reluctance to take any initiative that might be regarded unfavorably by American
authorities. The known number of incidents provides
therefore no adequate indication of the extent of the problem. Moreover, legal measures by the host country to compel locally incorporated companies not to comply with
foreign laws in such matters would frequently
face enor2 7
mously difficult issues of evidence and proof.

A last note on this issue. The involvement of transnational
enterprises in such problems is neither accidental nor exceptional. The possibility of interstate conflicts of this sort is inherent in the very nature of transnational enterprise, since
one of its principal characteristics is precisely the ability to
derive benefits from its presence in the territory of several
states, through the manipulation of each country's laws and
policies.
At the Threshold of Regulation
That the states themselves, by their actions and inactions,
have been in great part responsible for the spectacular
growth of transnational enterprise does not necessarily mean
that they are also capable of regulating it. Putting to one side
the "apprentice sorcerer" syndrome, a creator's inability to
control the forces he has set loose, there is a fundamental
distinction between eliminating and regulating a social institution. States may be able, if a sufficient number so
wished, to make transnational enterprise disappear. But it is
far more difficult for them to regulate it effectively. There is
too much we do not know concerning the exact consequences of various possible measures. And governments are
unwilling to risk the cost of error.
1 See (1974), 5 International Canada 230-32; (1975), 6 International Canada 5 and
31-32.
2 The recent amendments to the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970 c. C-23,
as amended by S.C. 1974-75, c.76 attempt to overcome this problem by broadening the scope of their prohibition of compliance with foreign government directives (see, sec. 31.6 (a)). It is doubtful that they can be successful in more than a
handful of cases.
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Yet, there is no doubt that regulation of transnational
enterprise is, and increasingly will be, a major task of governments in the 'seventies'. They can no longer ignore the concentration of power, economic and noneconomic, in the
hands of a small number of corporate managers. Governments (and peoples) have been alerted to the potential (and
sometimes actual) danger of control over the national
economy and indeed over the cultural and political life of
host countries by centralized foreign bureaucracies, whose
sole institutional concern is the maximization of profit on a
global scale. As a result, attempts at regulation of transnational enterprise have started, at various levels, in a great
variety of manners, and with uneven success.
At the national level, it has been the developed host countries (Canada, Australia, to a lesser extent Western Europe)
as well as the larger, semi-developed countries among the
developing (especially in Latin America) that have started to
build legal and administrative structures designed to supervise and control the activities of transnational enterprises. At
the international level, proposals for the drafting of "codes of
conduct" for transnational enterprises are fast becoming
reality: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has accepted a set of voluntary
guidelines; the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (itself a recent product of concern over the impact
of transnational enterprises) is taking the lead in the preparation of a world-wide code of conduct on transnational enterprises; the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) is well-advanced in the preparation
of an international code of conduct on the transfer of
technology; the International Labor Organization has conducted a number of studies on transnational enterprise and
social policy and is considering the preparation of guidelines
on the subject.
It will be quite interesting to examine the result of all this
frantic activity. At this point, however, it may be more useful
to stay at a high level of abstraction and briefly examine the
possible legal patterns
of transnational enterprise regulation
28
and their problems.
28For a useful study of approaches to regulation, from a differentj perspective, see,
P. A. Tharp, Jr., Transnational Enterprises and International Regulations: A
Survey of Various Approaches in International Organizations (1976), 30 Int'l
Organization 47. And see also J. N. Behrman, "Supernational Control of the
Multinational Enterprise," in D. Wallace and H. Ruof-Koch, eds., International
Control ofInvestment (New York: Praeger, 1974).
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The multitude of measures, national and international,
directed at the control of transnational enterprise may be
seen as ultimately converging on two fundamental goals or perhaps a dual goal: on the one hand, the elimination of
the transnational enterprise's multiple legal personality, and
on the other, the isolation of each transnational enterprise
unit, that is to say, the severence (or restriction) of each
unit's transnational linkages. These two patterns point at antithetical directions: the former affirms, and gives legal effect
to, the enterprise's global unity; the latter tends to break up
the enterprise into its constituent units. The one tends to
give legal recognition to economic reality; the other tends to
adapt economic reality to the legal form. If any of the
measures or series of measures taken were to be wholly effective, the contradictory nature of these two goals might
create problems. Since we are far from certain of the
ultimate effectiveness of any measure the two patterns may
coexist and indeed reinforce one another.
We noted earlier that the legal fiction of the separate personality of each corporation-member of a "group of companies" (whether transnational or not) was never fully
adhered to by the courts and other authorities. The possibility of "piercing the corporate veil" has existed and has been
used whenever the appropriate decision-makers found it
useful to do so. But this should not blind us to the fact that,
for a broad range of purposes and legal acts, not all of them
trivial, each corporation's separate legal personality is normally accepted; it becomes indeed something like a fact in
the eyes of the law.
Many of the measures, proposed or taken, for the control
of transnational enterprise deliberately disregard, or for legal
purposes eliminate, the fictional separation of personalities.
The imposition on an affiliate of obligations of disclosure
concerning the enterprise's global activities clearly points in
this direction. The revenue services' assessment of taxes on
the basis of their own reallocation of the transnational enterprise's global income among the various affiliates operates in
a similar manner. The provision recently enacted in some
Latin American countries, that royalty payments for
technology transfers between affiliates of the same transnational enterprise are treated as part of the parent's "profits"
(and are thus subject to any overall limits on profit remittance that may exist), does the same thing, perhaps more
clearly.
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The possibilities for legal action in this direction are legion.
The question ultimately raised is whether the corporate form
has reached the limits of its usefulness, whether perhaps the
passage from corporate capitalism to some other economic
system-capitalist or not-will occur through the undermining of the corporate form.
As for the isolation of transnational enterprise units, there
is perhaps less evidence of a trend, but there still seems to be
one. The efforts on the part of governments to exercize control over the flow of resources through the enterprise's
transnational channels and to compel each affiliate to comply fully not only with the laws of the host country but with its
policies and political or cultural preferences, lead ultimately
to a denial of the transnational enterprise's transnational
identity and to an affirmation of the separate identity of each
affiliate. There is logic to this movement. In the last analysis,
the conflict between the transnational centralization of
transnational enterprises and the decentralized international
legal order can be resolved either through the creation of an
effective centralized world public order or through the
dismantling of the transnational enterprise. The former
seems highly unlikely at this point.
Both legal patterns of regulation would lead ultimately to
the demise of the transnational enterprise, as it exists today.
Moderate advocates of its regulation are aware of this and
seek so to balance their measures as to change the patterns
of allocation of power and benefits between transnational
enterprise and state to the advantage of the latter, but
without reaching the point of endangering the existence of
transnational enterprise. It is a fine line to draw. In practice,
such concern, coupled with fear of retaliation by the transnational enterprises, often leads governments to measures of
mild and ineffectual regulation-increasing at best tax
revenues but not diminishing the transnational enterprises'
power. It is, of course, a settled feature of legal thinking to
avoid deciding issues by reference to "ultimate" questions or
by pushing criteria and arguments to their "logical conclusion". Yet, political rhetoric, or even the "law in the books",
generally fails to reflect reality as far as transnational enterprises are concerned. To coin a phrase, the rumours about
the death of transnational enterprise seem at the moment
exaggerated 29
29 For a pessimistic assessment of the transnational enterprises' present situation,
see S. J. Rubin, The Multinational Enterprise at Bay (1974), 68Am. J. Int'l L. 475.
L. 475.
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Other points of view are possible. The prospect of radical
decentralization, on a national and international scale, may
not be as utopian (or "romantic") as government and corporate managers believe. A decentralized world community
may choose to function at lower levels of productivity in
order to maximize other values and other goods. In such a
world, transnational enterprises would probably have no
place. But this is a topic for another, very different, essay.

